CO129-437 - Public Offices - 1916 — Page 150

This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.]

AFFAIRS OF CHINA.

CONFIDENTIAL.

C. S.

14209

REC

REGE 24 MAR 16

No. 1.

148

[February 15.j

SECTION 3.

4%

[29908]

(No. 22. Sir,

Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey. (Received February 15.) Confidential.)

Peking, January 20, 1916.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Yünnan-fu, which confirms and supplements the information contained in my despatch No. 6 of the 5th instant on the Yünnau crisis.

Mr. Goffe describes his interview with the Military Governor of the province and Tsai Ao, the leader of the insurrectionary movement, and the conversation shows that there is slight chance of any compromise between them and the Central Govern-

ment.

My telegram No. 34, to which Mr. Goffe refers, contained a summary of the information received from His Majesty's consuls regarding the attitude of the authorities at Canton and other important centres. This he was authorised to communicate unofficially to the promoters of the movement in Yünnan in the hope that it might tend to discourage them from persisting in their adventure.

Enclosure in No. 1.

I have, &c.

J. N. JORDAN.

Consul-General Goffe to Sir J. Jordan.

(No. 43. Confidential.) Sir,

Yünnan-fu, December 29, 1915. WITH reference to my telegram No. 65 of the 27th instant, I have the honour to report that at my interview with the Chiang Chun and General Ts'ai, after explaining that my visit was purely a private one, I proceeded to represent to them that they could not hope for either sympathy or support from any foreign Power; that the interests of other nations, as well as of China, required that the peace of the country should be undisturbed, especially at the present time; and that foreign opinion would fix a heavy responsibility on them if they lightly plunged their country into the miseries of civil war. General Ts'ai, who acted as spokesman throughout, said that be had hitherto been a warm supporter of the President, and he instanced his attitude during the second revolution on the Yang-tsze; he could not, however, sanction the President's violation of the Constitution, and be had no other course but to oppose him. As to where the responsibility for the present regrettable situation lay, that would always be a matter of opinion; and he instanced the divergence of views in Europe as to the responsibility for the present war. In any case, they held that the responsibility lay with the President for having broken his oath and violated the Constitution.

I urged that the difference between a constitutional monarchy and a republic was so slight that it did not justify plunging the country into the horrors of civil war; and I further objected that the vast majority of the population were indifferent as to the form of government under which they lived and only asked to be left in peace. Ts'ai replied that what I had said was quite true, but the President was only supported by a small clique, while a large proportion of the educated and influential classes were strongly in favour of a republic, He himself was perhaps inclined to favour a monarchy, but he had obligations to a large circle of republicans, similar to those of Great Britain.to Belgium, and he could not go back on them.

I reminded them of the phrase in Tang's telegram to the President, which said that the people "began to ask who was responsible for this extraordinary disgrace and insult which had been inflicted on the country," and I asked them whether they were not afraid that before long the same question would be asked about them. This non-

[2541 p-3]

Page 150Page 151